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Abstract
We study a credit market with adverse selection and moral hazard
where sufficient sorting is impossible. The crucial novel feature is the
competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. Quali-
ties of investment projects are not observable by banks and investment
decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible, but output conditional
on investment is. We explain the empirically observed prevalence of
debt contracts as an equilibrium phenomenon with competing lenders.
Equilibrium contracts must be immune against raisin–picking by com-
petitors. Non–debt contracts allow competitors to offer sweet deals to
particularly good debtors, who will self–select to choose such a deal,
while bad debtors distribute themselves across all offered contracts.
Competition of banks introduces three possibilities for a break-
down of credit markets that do not occur when a bank has a monopoly.
First, average returns decrease since banks compete for good lenders
which may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks
can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional equity
contracts to intermediate debtors. This combination, however, is in
turn dominated by a simple debt contract that is only attractive for
very good entrepreneurs. As a result no equilibrium in pure strategies
exists. Existence can be restored, if the permissible types of contracts
are limited by regulation resembling the separation of investment and
commercial banking in the U.S. Third, allowing for random delivery
on credit contracts leads to a break-down since all banks want to avoid
the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts
all bad entrepreneurs.
1 Introduction
A standard Arrow–Debreu setting does not impose any constraints on the
set of financial contracts. An important empirical phenomenon, however, is
the prevalence of debt contracts which points to the significance of market
imperfections. In this paper we show that in a competitive credit market
either debt contracts arise as a unique type of contract or credit markets
collapse. This collapse can be avoided if the number of types of contracts
banks can offer is limited which resembles the separation of investment and
commercial banking in the U.S. The key modeling device is an adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard framework where sufficient sorting is impossible and
where the decision of entrepreneurs to invest is not contractible. The crucial
novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts
offered when both adverse selection and moral hazard are present.
We consider a credit market with different types of entrepreneurs. They
require external resources to invest in a project. Creditors cannot observe
whether entrepreneurs invest or simply consume the resources granted to
them. Nonetheless, they can observe and verify the output when investment
has taken place at low costs. When only one bank offers financial contracts,
entrepreneurs must accept equity contracts, since the financier can condi-
tion the repayment on the final output. If, however, banks compete against
each other with a set of contracts, raisin–picking is not feasible anymore
and banks must obtain equal repayments in equilibrium from all good en-
trepreneurs. However, bad entrepreneurs cannot be hindered from accepting
financial contracts.
We identify three possibilities for a break-down of credit markets with
competing banks that do not occur when a bank has a monopoly. Put
differently, competition among financial intermediaries with menus of debt
and equity contracts yield three inefficiencies in addition to the standard
inefficiencies that arise in the presence of asymmetric information. First,
average returns decrease since banks compete for good entrepreneurs but
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cannot avoid bad entrepreneurs which may make the lending altogether un-
profitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a menu of debt and
equity contracts which, however, is dominated by a simple debt contract that
is only attractive for very good entrepreneurs. As a result the credit mar-
ket collapses. Existence can be restored in this scenario by a regulation that
separates commercial from investment banking. Finally, allowing for random
delivery on credit contracts leads to a break down since all banks want to
avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery because it attracts all
bad entrepreneurs. Transparency requirements about the terms under which
borrowers can receive loans could restore the functioning of the credit market
in this case.
A debt contract in our context is distinguished from an equity contract
by the nature of repayments. Under a debt contract, the creditor receives
the same repayments from all debtors who can pay back. Under an equity
contract, the bank receives the excess returns from all investing entrepreneurs
and thus returns under an equity contract depend on the success of the
investment project. The distinction between equity and debt contracts arises
solely from the perspective of banks: the investment projects are riskless for
entrepreneurs, but risky for banks because of asymmetric information. This
distinction of debt and equity contracts in terms of returns and risk for less
informed lenders is different from other recent explanations of the relevance
of debt contracts which we shall briefly summarize.
The incomplete contracting literature, e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1992,
Hart and Moore, 1988, 1994, Berglöf and von Thadden, 1994, and the surveys
of Hart, 1993 and 1995, explains why an investor enters into a debt contract
with an entrepreneur who promises to make certain repayments. If the agent
fulfills his obligations, he retains control of the asset. If he does not make
the repayments, control shifts to the investor. In our model a debt contract
also contains the right to control the assets in case of default. However, the
shift of control in our model is always associated with zero repayments and
the return characteristics distinguish debt and equity contracts.
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The costly state verification literature developed originally by Townsend
1978, Diamond 1984, Gale and Hellwig 1985, Willamson 1986 and extended
by e.g. Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Boyd and Smith 1993 and many others,
show that debt contracts arise as the unique type of contracts when revenues
from projects are private information, and ex post monitoring is costly. In
our model, there are no costs of monitoring the output if entrepreneurs have
invested, but it is impossible to prevent the entrepreneur from consuming his
obtained funds.
Finally, there exists a large stream of literature on the cost and benefits
of debt and equity in corporate finance, see Harris and Raviv, 1992, for a
survey. Apart from the focus on different return structures of debt and equity
contracts, none of these contributions follow our approach here.
Our model is also related to the literature on competition of principals in
markets with adverse selection which has stressed the role of sorting devices
and which has identified the possibility for a break-down of markets (see
Hellwig 1987 and Kreps 1990 for surveys). Our model combines moral hazard
and adverse selection and uses a very simple description of the returns of
investment projects, but we allow for arbitrary many types of entrepreneurs.
Each entrepreneur knows the return of his project and does not face any risk,
but banks face the possibility that entrepreneurs have a low-quality project
and no incentives to undertake investment. Moreover, no sorting device is
available to separate good entrepreneurs from bad ones. The interaction of
adverse selection and moral hazard in this economic environment creates new
collapse possibilities in credit markets when lenders compete with equity and
debt contracts. This could justify regulations.1
The tractable structure of our model may be useful for future applications.
As illustrated by Uhlig (1995) and Gersbach (1997), the model is a useful tool
to incorporate financial intermediation with adverse selection, moral hazard
1Our paper is also part of a broad literature examining the design of contracts in the
presence of adverse selection and moral hazard (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1990).
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and monitoring aspects into macroeconomic models to address regulatory
issues of financial markets or to examine fiscal and monetary policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we outline the model.
Then, we examine the bank’s decision problem. In section 4 we examine the
monopoly case. Sections 5 and 6 consider the competition case. The final
section concludes.
2 Model
There are two periods - “this” period and the “next” period. We consider
some finite number of entrepreneurs who have access to a project, but do not
have the funds to finance it. Entrepreneurs are of different types j = 1, . . . , n.
Entrepreneurs of type j have quality qj ≥ 0 and constitute a fraction γj of
the total entrepreneur population.
Qualities are labeled so that q1 < q2 < · · · < qn. Qualities qj are strictly
increasing in j. Projects are all of equal size. Suppose that the initial cost for
each project is I + z, but the entrepreneur’s initial wealth is only z. Hence,
an entrepreneur must borrow at least I for the project to go ahead.
Given additional resources I > 0, he can choose to invest (δj = 1) or not
(δj = 0). If he invests this period, he receives the cash flow
(I + z) · qj
next period. Otherwise, the return is unity and hence I + z. Entrepreneurs
cannot have negative wealth next period.
Entrepreneurs can borrow additional funds from banks. Banks face the
following informational asymmetries. The quality qj is known to the en-
trepreneur, but not to banks. Moreover, banks cannot observe whether or
not an entrepreneur invests. Thus, banks face a fixed pool of observationally
identical borrowers. The banks, however, can only observe and verify realized
cash flows next period if the entrepreneur invests. If the entrepreneur does
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not invest and simply consumes the funds granted to him, the banks cannot
expect any repayment. In this respect, our model is somewhat orthogonal to
the incomplete contract literature on financial contracts, where it is assumed
that the output is not or only partially verifiable, independent from whether
the entrepreneur invests.
It may be useful to discuss the main assumptions of our model. The
unobservability of the investment decision is a standard scenario. Often,
projects require specific human capital or may need the design of blueprints
for machinery, buildings or logistics. Or, an inventor may spend a lot of
time on reading and designing. Whether the efforts are directed towards
the project or whether blueprints are competently drafted is unlikely to be
observed by the bank.
The second assumption of our model is that the verification of output
conditional on investment is possible at low or zero costs while entrepreneurs
can have large private benefits if they do not invest. The assumption is
justified by the possibilities banks have in order to secure the repayments
if entrepreneurs invest. Monitoring to secure repayments takes many forms:
inspection of firms’ cash flow when customers pay, efforts to collateralize
assets if those have been created in the process of investment and of selling
products to customers. If the final products of the project of entrepreneurs
are physical goods such as houses or machines, banks can secure repayment
conditional on investment at very low costs. For simplicity, we assume that
costs of verifying cash flow is zero if the entrepreneur has invested. For
the same reason, we assume that repayment will be zero if entrepreneurs do
not invest and just consume the funds. Both assumptions about monitoring
possibilities can easily be relaxed.
There are potentially infinitely many banks (free entry); let m be the
number of banks entering eventually. Since we later invoke the revelation
principle, we can restrict contracts of banks to the class of contracts where
agents truthfully reveal their type to the bank. We first discuss the nature
of contracts and penalties for lying. Later we examine the corresponding
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participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Each bank i offers a
contract Ci = (πi,j, Ri,j)nj=1 which specifies the acceptance probability πi,j
and the repayment Ri,j . The contract has the following interpretation. An
entrepreneur applying for a loan at the bank i first needs to state his type, say
j. He will then receive the loan I with probability πi,j. If the entrepreneur
does not invest, he gets to eat all the funds available to him, and the bank gets
nothing and cannot observe the type ex post. This is a consequence of our
assumption that non-investing entrepreneurs cannot be forced to pay back.
The quality of the investment project and thus the type of the entrepreneur
does not matter in this case. If the entrepreneur invests instead, and is indeed
of type j, the bank gets the Ri,j. If such an entrepreneur cannot pay back
Ri,j, the bank receives qj(I + z) unless it is stated otherwise in the contract.
If the entrepreneur invests and turns out to be of a different type, say k 6= j,
the bank receives the entire cash flow qk(I + z), penalizing the lying agent2.
We will distinguish two cases: contracts without random delivery, i.e.
πi,j ∈ {0; 1} and contracts where random delivery is allowed, i.e. πi,j ∈ [0; 1].
An entrepreneur derives utility from terminal wealth Wj. Entrepreneurs
are risk neutral: thus, their payoff uj is expected wealth. If entrepreneurs
have received additional funds from banks they decide whether to invest.
The payoff of an entrepreneur, conditional on receiving a credit from bank i,
amounts to:
ui,j(δj) = (1− πi,j)z + πi,j (δj max{0; (qj(z + I)−Ri,j)}+ (1− δj)(z + I))
(1)
The entrepreneur chooses δj ∈ {0, 1} to maximize ui,j(δj).
2We could allow banks to choose weaker sanctions for lying. For instance, an entrepre-
neur who announces to be type j, but is type k and invests could be treated as if he were
type k. Allowing such weaker penalties in contracts makes the analysis more cumbersome.
It will turn out that in no equilibrium it will be profitable for banks to offer contracts
which are otherwise similar, but involve weaker penalties, if false announcements of types
are detected. Allowing stronger penalties, like negative wealth, can certainly be thought
of too, but have been ruled out by assumption.
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Banks are assumed to be risk neutral. A bank can borrow unlimited
funds at an interest rate v = 0. Clearly, a bank can only get a repayment
if the entrepreneur invests, since otherwise the entrepreneur consumes the
funds. Banks will not enter if the funds granted to entrepreneurs in this
period exceed the expected repayments.
There are some contracts of a special type to which we have to refer to
occasionally, and for which it is handy to have names. We call a contract
(πi,j, Ri,j)nj=1 a pure equity contract, if πi,j ≡ 1 and if Ri,j = (qj−1)(I+z).
3 In
that case, the bank bears the entire risk. We call a contract a convertible debt
at repayment R, if πi,j ≡ 1 and if Ri,j = min{R; (qj−1)(I+z)}. Hence, if the
return of the project is below R, the entrepreneur can convert the contract
into a portion of the equity with associated repayment (qj − 1)(I + z). We
call a contract a pure debt contract at repayment R, if πi,j = 1 for all j and
if the repayment Ri,j ≡ R is independent of the type j. Moreover, under
a pure debt contract, the bank obtains qj(I + z) if the entrepreneur has
invested but cannot pay back R.4 We aim at showing that any equilibrium
with competition among creditors of the game which we are about to define
can only involve pure debt contracts, unless the credit market breaks down.
The game unfolds as follows:
1. Banks simultaneously decide whether or not to enter and which con-
tract to offer upon entering.
2. Entrepreneurs simultaneously choose banks and reveal their type.
3. The funding–lotteries (πi,j) are executed (i.e. entrepreneurs have no
chance of switching banks ex-post, if they are turned down).
3A pure equity contract can be bounded from above by the legal right of the entre-
preneur to obtain a repayment according to his capital share. In such cases, we need the
additional assumption zqj ≤ I + z ∀j.
4Hence, the debt contract contains the right of the lender to control the assets in case
of default. In equilibrium, the shift of control will be associated with zero repayment since
the entrepreneur will not decide to invest if returns are below R.
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4. Funded entrepreneurs make a decision whether to invest.
5. Payoffs are realized and repayments occur.
An equilibrium to this game is a pure strategy, subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. It is a self–selection model in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) or Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). However, apart from differences in the
returns of the investment projects, we have three additional complications.
First, there is a moral hazard problem since entrepreneurs cannot be forced
to invest. Second, non–investing entrepreneurs cannot be separated from
investing entrepreneurs in the selection process. Hence, standard sorting
devices such as collateral (see Bester 1985, Bester 1987), cannot be used to
separate bad entrepreneurs from good ones. Third, we allow for arbitrary
many types of entrepreneurs who have good projects. Competition of banks
for such good types creates the distinction between debt and equity contracts
and leads to the additional inefficiencies.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a set of credit contracts, such that
each contract earns non–negative profits for a bank and creditors respond
optimally in revealing their type and undertaking investments. Moreover,
there exists no other contract for a bank which, when offered in addition,
earns positive profits.
We assume additionally three tie–breakers in case of indifference for the
entrepreneurs, which we state briefly now and describe in greater detail in
the analysis below. First, entrepreneurs who are indifferent between invest-
ing and not investing always choose to invest. Similarly, entrepreneurs who
are indifferent between telling the truth and lying always choose to reveal
their true type. Second, investing entrepreneurs, who are indifferent between
several banks, will choose each bank with equal probability. Third, entrepre-
neurs, who choose not to invest, will randomize across their most preferred
banks so as to mimic the investing entrepreneurs. The first two tie–breaker
rules are standard and innocuous, while the third tie–breaker rule is critical
to the analysis and will be discussed in more detail when we examine com-
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petition in the credit market. Let j∗ = min{j | qj ≥ 1}. Hence, j∗ is the
first index value for which the return of the investment project is greater or
equal to one.
Proposition 1 The first best solution, in which a planner possesses complete
information and can dictate the investment decision, is characterized by δj =
1, iff qj ≥ 1, i.e., if j ≥ j∗.
In words, the social planner dictates to invest precisely in all those projects
which meet at least the opportunity costs. The proposition is obvious.
3 The Decision Problem of the Bank
We first examine the last three stages of the game. The payoff for an invest-
ing, truth–telling entrepreneur of type j choosing bank i is given by (1) with
δj = 1, yielding payoff
πi,j(min{Ri,j , qj(I + z)} − I),
for the bank from these entrepreneurs.
The payoff of any non-investing entrepreneur of type j, who chooses bank
i and claims to be of type k 6= j, is given by
ρ̃(i, j, k) = (1− πi,k)z + πi,k(I + z) = z + πi,kI
Note, that this entrepreneur will not invest, because of our “full confiscation
in case of lying” assumption. The bank expects to loose the loaned resources
πi,kI.
Next we examine the decisions of the entrepreneur at the bank. Invoking
the revelation principle, we can restrict contracts of banks to the class of
revelation compatible contracts where entrepreneurs have an incentive to
truthfully reveal their types to the bank. Let ρ(i, j) = max0≤δj≤1 ui,j(δj)
be the payoff to an entrepreneur of type j to choose bank i, who correctly
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reveals his type j and chooses whether to invest (δj = 1) or not (δj = 0).
The contract Ci is said to be revelation compatible5, if for all j,
ρ(i, j) ≥ max
k
ρ̃(i, j, k),
i.e. if entrepreneurs are better off telling the truth.
One could add a participation constraint, requiring
(1− πj) · z + πj · (max (qj(I + z)−Ri,j, z + I)) ≥ z for j = 1, . . . , n
Obviously, that participation constraint is automatically fulfilled since the
entrepreneurs do not risk loosing anything by participating in the game.
They can always take the received credit and consume the total amount of
funds.
Let γi,j be the joint probability that an entrepreneur is of type j and





Consider an entrepreneur of type j. Given choices between revelation com-
patible contracts, he will have to maximize ρ(i, j). If there is at least one
contract, for which ρ(i, j) is maximal at δj = 1, we assume that the en-
trepreneur will only choose to invest, δj = 1 (this is the first tie–breaker
mentioned above), and pick any of the banks, at which ρ(i, j) is maximized
for δj = 1, with equal probability (this is the second tie–breaker mentioned
above). These random picks determine γi,j for these entrepreneurs. We call
these entrepreneurs the investors. Let L be the set of all investor indices j,





5We could also use the term “incentive compatible”. Note, however, that our con-
tracts still allow agents to shirk in the sense of not investing. Thus, the term “incentive
compatible” may be misleading, leading to the choice of this term here.
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Note that λ is endogenous since it is a function of the contracts offered.
All other entrepreneurs, i.e. those entrepreneurs, for which ρ(i, j) can
only be maximized by setting δj = 0, are called shirkers: they will not
invest. Shirking means that they do not repay anything to the bank in the
next period. To insure truth telling, we get the following proposition:




for all shirkers j 6∈ L.
Proof: For j 6∈ L, the revelation compatibility constraint can be rewritten
as
(1− πi,j)z + πi,j(I + z) = max
k
{(1− πi,k)z + πi,k(I + z)},
implying the result of the proposition because of I > 0. •
Shirkers will choose the bank that offers the highest chance for them to
receive the investment amount I . Let B(j) = {i | πi,j = maxk πi,k} be
the set of all bank indices i, that offer that highest chance to investors of
type j. Below, we will show that B(j) is the entire set, B(j) = {1, . . . ,m}.
Note that shirkers truthfully reveal their type by the revelation compatibility
of the contract. Shirkers are indifferent between banks in the set B(j); in
order to break that indifference, we are assuming our third tie–breaker rule.
We assume that shirkers distribute themselves across the banks i ∈ B(j) in
exactly the same way as the investors do, i.e. we assume that a shirker of










i∈B(j) pi,j = 1. Obviously, γi,j = pi,jγj for j 6∈ L.
6
This is a critical assumption for the further analysis, and is therefore
worth some discussion. Imagine that investors distribute themselves across
banks first, and that the size of a bank is then given by the number of
investors financed by it. If shirkers distribute themselves according to bank
size, they end up mimicking the investors.7 An alternative story may run
as follows. Indifferent borrowers are those who are of low quality and do
not invest. Thus, they are indifferent because their terminal wealth does not
depend on different repayments offered in the various contracts, and the funds
provided by banks under different contracts are the same. Then, shirkers may
want to mimic honest investors as best as they can, distributing themselves
across lenders in the same proportion as honest investors. Suppose that a
lender offers a new contract. Suppose that this new contract offers high
quality entrepreneurs a better deal, while entrepreneurs with low quality are
still indifferent since they do not invest. Certainly, investors would then
redistribute themselves. If shirkers do not redistribute themselves likewise,
they could be detected because they are not moving. The shirkers would be
those that can never be attracted by such a new contract. Since they are
indifferent about these contracts, they might as well move and thus avoid
detection this way.
4 The Monopoly Case
We first consider the monopoly case, i.e. only one bank can offer contracts
and further entry is impossible. To examine optimal contracts, we apply
the revelation principle again, since the bank chooses an optimal mechanism
6If the set L is empty, i.e., if all entrepreneurs are shirkers, we assume that shirkers
distribute themselves arbitrarily across banks. Since this case does not occur in equilibrium
or in any relevant deviation strategies, the assumption is harmless.
7What counts is the proportion of shirkers a potential bank expects to attract. We
assume that this proportion is monotonically related to the size of banks.
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under incomplete information about the quality of the entrepreneurs. This
implies that the bank can restrict its attention to credit policies that induce
applicants to truthfully reveal their type. Recall that j∗ is the first index
value for which qj ≥ 1.








In words, ψ∗ is the profit of the bank if it obtains repayments above the
invested funds from all entrepreneurs with quality levels of at least unity,
i.e., if it offers a pure equity contract. From the entrepreneurs with lower
quality, the bank suffers a loss equal to the granted credit. In the next
proposition, we characterize the optimal credit policy by the bank using this
profit expression.
Proposition 3
1. If ψ∗ ≥ 0, then the optimal credit policy is given by the pure equity
contract. Entrepreneurs invest, iff j ≥ j∗. The optimal credit policy is
efficient.
2. If ψ∗ < 0, then optimal credit policy is given by
πj = 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
The optimal credit policy is inefficient.
Credit policy by a monopolist is inefficient for ψ∗ < 0, since in this case,
credits for good projects are not granted. This source of inefficiency is present
because the contracts are pooling with respect to bad entrepreneurs. They
can not be distinguished from investing entrepreneurs. For ψ∗ ≥ 0, the mix
of good and bad projects is sufficiently favorable so that the bank can com-
pensate losses in low return projects by equity participation in projects with
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high returns. The distribution of funds involves a subsidy to bad entrepre-
neurs by banks and, ultimately, by good entrepreneurs. The monopolistic
bank gets all rents from good entrepreneurs (j ≥ j∗). However, the bank
cannot separate bad from good entrepreneurs.
Proof:
1. For j with πj > 0, it is obvious that Rj < 0 can never be optimal for
the monopolist, since the bank incurs losses. For πj = 0 we can assume
Rj ≥ 0 w.l.o.g.. Similarly, we can restrict Rj to be bounded above
by (I + z)qn, say, since that repayment as any higher repayment will
not be delivered upon by entrepreneurs: they will not invest. Thus,
an optimal contract (πj, Rj) exists, since it maximizes the continuous
profit function over a compact set.
2. Let π = maxπj. Consider an entrepreneur with j < j
∗. Since Rj ≥ 0,
this entrepreneur will not invest, j 6∈ L. Proposition 2 implies πj = π.
3. Consider an entrepreneur with qj ≥ 1 and hence j ≥ j∗. The optimal
contract must pick πj and Rj so that πjRj is maximized subject to the
revelation constraint under investing,
(1− πj)z + πj (qj(I + z)−Rj) ≥ (1− π)z + π(I + z)
or
πjRj ≤ πj(I + z)(qj − 1) − (π − πj)I
and the bound πj ≤ π: The solution is given by πj = π and (if πj 6= 0)
Rj = (I + z)(qj − 1).
4. The optimal contract then solves maxπ∈[0;1] πψ∗. The conclusion follows
upon comparison with the first best solution, see proposition 1.
•
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5 Competitive Credit Markets without Ran-
dom Acceptance
We next consider competitive credit markets. By assumption, we shall rule
out πi,j ∈ (0, 1) in this section, i.e. we do not allow banks to base delivery
on some random device. Thus, we shall henceforth assume that πi,j ≡ 1
for all banks that offer contracts. Therefore, as indicated by proposition
2, shirkers are indifferent between all banks offering at least one type of








Let us calculate the expected payoff ψi for a bank i from the contract
Ci = (Ri,j)nj=1 when the contract does not contain any additional specifica-
tion of repayments in the case of default. That payoff is obtained by summing
all the payments received from the different types of agents next period mi-
nus the payments made to them this period, weighting them with the joint












Proof: Note that Ri,j is indeed the repayment to a bank i, if j ∈ L is
an investing type visiting this bank with positive probability γi,j > 0. Put
differently, if the bank would get qj(I+z) rather than Ri,j from these agents,
these agents would have chosen not to invest in the first place, since their
payoff would be zero. The term −I/λ = −I (1 + (1− λ)/λ) arises from
the resources given to each investor plus the resources lost to the (1− λ)/λ









implying the result with equation (2). •
This proposition shows that each investor brings a share of shirkers with
him who imitate him. Of all the loans made by the bank, only the share λ
reaches investors, whereas the share 1− λ are embezzled by shirkers with no
chance for the bank to see any repayment. Since these extra sunk costs of
lending are independent of the type of the honest entrepreneur, it now seems
plausible that the contracts offered in equilibrium are pure debt contracts.
Indeed, a direct consequence is:
Proposition 5 If there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the game, then




Proof: Let j ∈ L be an investor and let i > 0 be a bank with γi,j > 0:
such that i, j must exist, if there is at least one bank. We first show, that
Ri,j ≤ Iλ . If indeed Ri,j >
I
λ
, a bank k which chose not to enter could have
instead chosen to enter and to offer a slightly better contract just to agents
of type j, i.e. to offer Rk,j with
I
λ
< Rk,j < Ri,j to agent j and Rk,l = ∞
to all other agents. As a result, investors of type j will choose this bank,
bringing along the respective share of shirkers, while all other investor types
will remain with the banks they would have chosen otherwise. But now, the
profits to this bank are positive, γj(Rk,j −
I
λ
), in contradiction to free entry.








any i ∈ B, j ∈ L, for which γi,j > 0, since otherwise the bank would
make negative expected profits. Hence, cross-subsidization of borrowers is
impossible, since Ri,j ≤ I/λ.
Finally we have to rule out that entrepreneurs with j 6∈ L end up shirking
just because their Ri,j exceeds I/λ. Suppose to the contrary that for some
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shirker j 6∈ L, we have I
λ
≤ (qj − 1)(I + z). But then, a bank could offer
an additional contract to these shirkers at a repayment I
λ
. This would yield
non–negative repayments from these entrepreneurs who become investors and
would raise λ, an effect which reduces the amount of resources lost to shirk-
ers. Overall profits for this bank increase. •
Several remarks are necessary. Note that proposition 5 implies that it is
impossible for two contracts asking for different repayments from investing
entrepreneurs to be offered in equilibrium. Furthermore, although the equi-
librium contracts are uniquely specified, two indeterminacies occur. First,
the repayment asked from a shirker could also be higher (or even somewhat
lower) than described in proposition 5 without altering the allocation of cred-
its, since shirkers do not invest at all. Second, in equilibrium banks make
zero profits from all investing entrepreneurs if the accompanying share of
shirkers is accounted for. Nonetheless, banks may not offer a credit to all
investing types of entrepreneurs and instead pick e.g. Ri,j = (I + z)qj and
thus γi,j = 0 for some j ∈ L. It must be true that γk,j 6= 0, for some other
bank k. Since Rk,j =
I
λ




By our second tie-breaker assumption of a uniform random distribution of
investors across their most preferred banks, bank i would now see a positive
fraction of entrepreneurs of type j to apply for loans at bank i, and likewise,
the other banks would receive less customers. However, this does not change
the payoffs to the banks or the entrepreneurs, nor would it change the total
amount invested. It is in this sense that the equilibrium does not change.
We next determine the value of λ. Provided that banks offer contracts at
some repayment R, it is easy to separate investors from shirkers:
L = L(R) = {j | (qj − 1)(I + z) ≥ R}
Likewise, we can find the total fraction of the population that invests,















= λ(R)R − I
be the sum of the expected profits to the banks, given that they all charge
R. Finally, let R∗ be the lowest repayment, for which G(R) is zero:
R∗ = min{R|G(R) = 0}
Obviously, R∗ may not exist. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose that R∗ exists. In any subgame perfect equilibrium




Proof: We have shown in the last proposition, that if there is a Nash
equilibrium, then it can be written in the form of a pure debt contract at
repayment R = I/λ. Suppose that R > R∗. If G(R) < 0, this can certainly
be no equilibrium.8 Hence, suppose G(R) > 0.9 In that case, there is a
value R̃, R∗ < R̃ < R with G(R̃) > 0. A bank offering debt contracts at the
repayment R̃ will draw the entire market (since investors are better off at
lower repayments, and since shirkers imitate investors), and makes positive
profits G(R̃), a contradiction to free entry. Thus, we must have R = R∗.






The proof of this proposition has a flavor similar to an argument made by
8This could occur if the function G(R) touches zero from below without crossing it.
9We rule out the knife-edge case where the function G(R) is zero for a continuum of
interest rates.
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Mankiw, 1986. Note that this proposition rests on the fact that a new en-
tering bank changes the decomposition of entrepreneurs into investors and
shirkers: it is the shift of some shirkers into investors that makes the entry
at the lower repayment profitable.
To summarize: if there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with pos-
itive amounts of loans handed out, it must be the case that banks charge
the repayment R∗. So, if there is an equilibrium, it is unique in the sense
of yielding a unique allocation of resources. However, we have not provided
sufficient conditions for existence. Indeed, we will show that the possibility
of offering equity and debt contracts introduces a substantial problem for
the functioning of the credit market. To that end, we consider a particular
deviation from the candidate equilibrium at Ri,j ≡ R∗. Recall that j∗ is the
first index value for which qj ≥ 1.
Proposition 7 Suppose that R∗ exists. Suppose that the set of intermediate
quality shirkers
S = {j∗, . . . , n}/L(R∗)
in the candidate equilibrium is not empty. Then, no subgame perfect equilib-
rium in pure strategies exists. Otherwise, there exists a Nash equilibrium at
the repayment R∗.
Proof: Consider the candidate equilibrium in which all banks chose the
debt contract with repayment R∗. Let λ = λ(R∗), let L = L(R∗) and let
λ̃ = λ(0). Choose some ε > 0 sufficiently small: a new entering bank could
offer a convertible debt contract at repayment R∗ − ε. This turns all j ∈ S
into investors, raising the fraction of investors from λ to λ̃. Furthermore,
all previous investors j ∈ L will strictly prefer this contract. The shirkers
will mimic the investors. The bank will therefore capture the entire market.























γi ((qj − 1)(I + z)) +G(R
∗)− ελ
> G(R∗) = 0
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Hence the bank makes positive expected profit
and this deviation destroys the candidate equilibrium. Therefore, no equi-
librium exists.
Conversely, suppose that S is empty. Thus, entrepreneurs either invest or
are of such low quality that no bank can induce them to invest without incur-
ring losses beyond those incurred due to shirking. Hence, a newly entering
bank cannot profitably change the composition of investors and shirkers, i.e.
λ cannot change by offering additional contracts. Then the previous propo-
sition above shows that a deviation cannot be profitable, since charging less
than I/λ means loosing money. Hence, if S is empty, no profitable deviation
is possible. •
It is worth discussing why an equilibrium may fail to exist in proposition
7. If intermediate quality levels exist, i.e. if the set S is not empty, then the
debt contract in the candidate equilibrium is not attractive enough for en-
trepreneurs j ∈ S in order to induce them to invest. But then, a bank could
offer the capped equity contract at repayment R∗ − ε. This new contract
yields higher profits than the original debt contract. However, this contract
cannot be an equilibrium either. This follows directly from proposition 5.
More intuitively, it follows since such a contract is dominated by a simple
debt contract for high quality entrepreneurs with slightly better conditions.
Assume additionally that the bank offering this debt contract just breaks
even, given the enlarged set of investors. This leaves only entrepreneurs with
intermediate and bad quality levels for the capped equity contract. The
cross-subsidization from high quality entrepreneurs disappears. The capped
equity contract now generates a loss, since it recoups less from each investing
entrepreneur than the new break-even debt contract (via the self-selection of
entrepreneurs), but looses the same resources to the accompanying shirkers.
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Overall, the competitive credit market breaks down.
Proposition 7 indicates that the debt contract arises as the unique type
of credit contract in equilibrium. If the competitive equilibrium exists, the
allocation is efficient since all entrepreneurs with good projects are granted
credits and invest. Hence, competitive credit markets can lead to the first
best solution under the following two circumstances: only entrepreneurs with
high quality or a mix between very good and bad entrepreneurs are in the
market. If entrepreneurs with intermediate quality levels are present in the
market, competitive credit markets break down. Monopoly credit markets
can also break down: this is the case if ψ∗ < 0 in proposition 3. Comparing
proposition 3 with proposition 7, one sees that competitive markets break
down more often than monopolistic markets.
The nonexistence of equilibria can lead to collapse phenomena in the
credit market. Three alternatives can be considered. On the equilibrium side,
mixed strategies can be examined. We will consider randomized strategies
in the next section. Moreover, refinements of the equilibrium notion can be
applied in the tradition of Wilson, Riley or Hellwig (see Hellwig 1987 and
Kreps 1990 for surveys) which, however, looks less promising in our context.10
On the regulatory side, one can ask which regulatory schemes can prevent
a potential break down. We are focusing on regulations that still preserve
competition of lenders, but that can avoid a collapse of credit markets. We
consider a regulatory scheme, which resembles the separation of investment
banking and commercial banking in the U.S. Given a particular condition, we
will show that such a regulation can restore the functioning of credit markets
under some condition. To describe the condition that we need, suppose that
10It can be shown that some dynamic extensions of the game that allow for removals
or additions of contracts over time can yield existence and therefore avoid a collapse.
However, as discussed in Hellwig 1987 and Kreps 1990 it remains unclear which dynamic
game theoretic formalizations are appropriate.
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be the average profit generated by an intermediate quality entrepreneur j ∈ S










since R̄ < R∗ and thus G(R̄) < 0 by the definition of R∗. Assumption 1 is
a bit stronger than (3). For some special cases, e.g. if S is a singleton, that
assumption can be shown to hold, but one can also find counterexamples
to the conjecture that it holds in general. The regulatory scheme adds a
pre-step to the game:
0. Banks have to decide which type of contracts they are offering if they
enter the market. They are only allowed to offer either pure equity
contracts or pure debt contracts.
1.-5. Original game.
Proposition 8
(i) Suppose that R∗ exists and that assumption 1 holds. Then, a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium for the regulated credit market exists and
takes the form of a pure debt contract equilibrium at the repayment R∗.
(ii) Suppose that R∗ exists and that assumption 1 does not hold. Then, no
subgame perfect equilibrium exists for the regulated credit market.
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Proof:
(i) We have already shown that a subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and
takes this form, provided it exists. This conclusion is not altered by the
additional pre-step, although the argument is somewhat different. We
shall skip the details. Briefly, there are only three candidate equilibria,
the other two being a mixed equity - debt equilibrium and the pure
equity equilibrium. The mixed debt - equity equilibrium cannot be
one, because the return on equity is strictly dominated by the return
on debt. The pure equity equilibrium cannot be one, because it can
be destroyed by a bank offering a debt contract to the best entrepre-
neurs. It remains to be shown that the pure debt candidate equilibrium
cannot be destroyed by an equity contract. Thus, suppose that an ad-
ditional bank decides to offer a pure equity contract. It will draw all
entrepreneurs j ∈ S to it, leading them to invest, and generating prof-
its R̄ on average. Thus, the fraction λ̃ = λ(0) is now the fraction of
entrepreneurs who are investors. The bank will also attract shirkers
according to this new proportion, and thus make net profits of R̄− I/λ̃
per entrepreneur. This will not be profitable by assumption 1.
(ii) The proof of (ii) follows the considerations of proposition 7. By (i) a
bank can add a profitable equity contract to a pure debt contract of
another bank with repayment R∗. The combination of such a debt and
equity contract is the only candidate for an equilibrium. But then a
third bank can offer a pure debt contract with better conditions for
entrepreneurs leaving intermediate entrepreneurs and a corresponding
share of shirkers for the equity contract. This deviation from the can-
didate equilibrium will destroy the profitability of the equity contract.
•
23
The preceding discussion can provide a new argument why the separation
of financial activities can be beneficial, since limiting the number of types of
contracts a financial institution can offer restores the equilibrium. Note that
the regulation does not require that banks issue a specific type of contract.
Hence, a bank can choose to be either an investment bank or a commercial
bank at the beginning, but not both. This conclusion is related to the widely
known Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibits commercial banks from
underwriting, holding, or dealing in corporate securities. Today the appropri-
ate degree of separation between commercial and investment banking is still
hotly debated, see e.g. Kroszner and Rajan, 1994, for a recent study. Tra-
ditionally, most arguments in favor of such regulations rely on increased risk
for bank failures, if the separation is not enforced, or on unfair advantages
of banks in security business due to cost and informational advantages. The
preceding discussion suggests that limiting the type of contracts a financial
institution can offer is beneficial for the functioning of the credit market.
A question arises as to what should happen if assumption 1 is violated.
In that case, it can be shown that the pure equity contract will indeed be
profitable in the candidate equilibrium, and thus destroys it. From a regu-
latory perspective, this could be avoided by only permitting debt contracts.
There have been many debates about the absence of a functioning venture
capital market in Europe, often ascribing it to regulations rather than lacking
entrepreneurial spirit. One interpretation in light of this theory is that such
regulations might actually be beneficial: if a venture capital market were to
develop for the same borrower classes, it could destroy existing credit mar-
kets. Clearly, other arguments need to be added in order to receive to a
balanced perspective on this policy issue. Our theoretical predictions that
equity markets or venture capital markets cannot coexist with pure debt
contract markets is surely too sharp. We nonetheless believe that we have
captured one important aspect of these markets with our theory.
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6 Competitive Credit Markets with Random
Acceptance
In this section, we consider what happens if banks are allowed to offer con-
tracts with random delivery, i.e. they are allowed to offer funding lotteries
(πi,j) with 0 ≤ πi,j ≤ 1 which we shall call random delivery. Random deliv-
ery is a particular form of credit rationing, since borrowers only receive funds
with a certain probability. We obtain:
Proposition 9 Suppose that random delivery is allowed. Then, no subgame
perfect equilibrium exists.
Proof: Suppose that S = {j∗, . . . , n}/L(R∗) is empty, i.e. that there are
no intermediate quality shirkers in the candidate equilibrium. Otherwise,
adapting the proof of proposition 7 to this context shows that no subgame
perfect equilibrium exists.
If one bank offers the debt contract R∗ = I
λ(R∗)
, which is the only candi-
date for an equilibrium without random delivery, another bank, say i, could
enter and offer the following contracts for some small ε > 0









Clearly this contract will not be taken by shirkers since the delivery chance
is lower than with the pure debt contract.
However, for investors under the pure debt contract, payoffs for this new
contract are increased, provided ε > 0 is sufficiently small:
ρ(i, j) = qj(I + z)−R







−ε (qj(I + z)−R
∗)
> qj(I + z)−R
∗
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Thus, this bank makes a positive profit, since it faces only genuine investors,
and the pure debt contract cannot be an equilibrium.
However, the same considerations apply to any other set of contracts, as
possible equilibrium candidates. A bank can always enter and offer a slightly
lower delivery probability, while slightly improving the terms for investing
entrepreneurs. Therefore, no bank wants to offer a contract with the highest
delivery probability. Hence, all banks try to avoid the contract with the
highest delivery chance.
On the other hand, if no bank offers a contract with positive delivery
chances, it is profitable to offer the pure debt contract with repayment above
R∗. Thus, no equilibrium exists. •
The last proposition shows that banks want to avoid shirkers by lowering
their delivery probability.11 This can be achieved by being clear about the
terms of the contract but being opaque about the procedure for the delivery.
The regulatory actions to prevent the collapse of credit markets with random
delivery chances are less clear but still possible. For instance, the danger that
banks could engage in a race for lower delivery chances could provide a ratio-
nale for transparency requirements in the credit market. Transparency would
ensure that there is no uncertainty under which conditions an applicant can
receive a loan. For instance under the Ordover and Weiss (1981) policy pro-
posal, active banks would be forced to lend to all borrowers at some interest
rate. Such a policy requirement would be effective because banks cannot
11We conjecture that not even a subgame perfect equilibrium in symmetric mixed strate-
gies of banks exists. The contracts offered under mixed strategies which have the highest
delivery chance would always be chosen by the shirkers. Hence, given an equilibrium in
mixed strategies, all banks would have an incentive to lower slightly the delivery proba-
bility for all contracts while improving the conditions for investors in order to avoid the
shirkers. The same consideration apply to any revised support of random delivery pos-
sibilities. The profit functions are not upper-hemicontinuous and the Dasgupta-Maskin
theorem (Dasgupta and Maskin 1986) cannot be used to establish existence of mixed
strategy equilibria for discontinuous games.
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avoid shirkers by charging very high interest rates. Thus, banks have no in-
centive to lower delivery probabilities on all contracts offered and equilibrium
in pure debt contracts would be restored. However, such regulation would in
the end deny banks to ration credits, and thus may have other disadvantages.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have offered a simple explanation for the prevalence of
debt contracts by focusing on a simple model of credit markets with adverse
selection and moral hazard. The crucial novel feature is the competition
between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. We have focused on
the distinguishing feature between debt and equity participation, that debt
contracts are limited in their repayments upward, and entrepreneurs are the
residual claimant of high returns. If an equilibrium in competitive credit
markets exists, the resulting allocation is first–best. However, competition
among banks in offering contracts creates three collapse possibilities, which,
in turn, can provide a rationalization for regulating the number of contracts
particular financial institutions are allowed to offer.
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